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As  of  January  1989,  the  Federal  Savings  and 
Loan  Insurance  Corporation  (FSLIC)  listed  approxi- 
mately  340  federally  insured  savings  and loan institu- 
tions  as insolvent.  Estimates  of the  cost  of meeting 
obligations  to  the  insured  depositors  of these  insol- 
vent  institutions  run  from  $90  billion  to  about  $285 
billion.’  But  such  estimates  refer  to  the  cost  net  of 
recoveries,  which  means  that  the  initial  outlays 
needed  to  close  the  insolvent  institutions  could  be 
much  higher. 
FDIC  Chairman  William  Seidman  has  estimated 
that  as many  as 700  to  800  FSLIC  insured  savings 
and  loans  with  an  aggregate  $400  billion  in  assets 
will  ultimately  need  to  be  sold,  reorganized,  or 
liquidated.2  Because  the  FSLIC’s  cash  reserves  have 
dwindled  to less than  $2 billion, the fund cannot  close 
its insolvent  institutions  without  substantial  outside 
assistance.  And  indeed,  Congress  is now  consider- 
ing legislation  that  would  authorize  up to $50  billion 
in additional  borrowing  to  close  or  merge  the  most 
deeply  insolvent  thrifts. 
Although  the  commercial  banking  industry  and  its 
insurance  fund,  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Cor- 
poration  (FDIC),  have  fared  somewhat  better  than 
the  thrift  industry,  the  past  decade  has  witnessed 
record  numbers  of  bank  failures.  While  the  FDIC 
claims  to  face  no  backlog  of insolvent  banks  under 
its supervision,  the  caseload  of “troubled”  banks  re- 
mains  high  by  post-Depression  standards.  In  fact, 
the  agency  recorded  its  first  annual  loss  in  its  5.5 
years  of  existence  in  1988.  The  fund’s  net  worth 
dropped  23  percent,  from  $18.3  billion  at  the  end 
of  1987  to  $14.1  billion  as  of  the  end  of  1988.3 
While  sufficient  to  deal  with  any  failures  foresee- 
able under  present  circumstances,  the  reserves  could 
prove  inadequate  in the  event  of a major  economic 
1 “GAO  Puts  Cost  of  S&L  Rescue  at  $285  Billion,”  Th  WX 
Street Journal, May  22,  1989. 
2 “Questions  Arise  over  Size  and  Scope  of  Resolution  Trust 
Carp,”  Atneticun  Banker (March  17,  1989);  see  also  Peter  J. 
Elmer,  “Notes,  Guarantees  Needed  in FSLIC  Bailout,” American 
Bunker, June  6,  1989. 
3 “FDIC’s  Shortfall  Hit  $10 Billion in ‘88,” Amertcan &z&m  (April 
26,  1989). 
dislocation  such  as  a recession  or  massive  defaults 
on  loans  to  less  developed  countries. 
The  Shadow  Financial  Regulatory  Committee,  a 
group  of  prominent  academics,  bankers,  and  at- 
torneys  who  analyze  and  comment  on  matters  of 
financial  regulation,  has  estimated  that  the  true  net 
worth  of  the  FDIC  approaches  zero  if the  agency 
were  to establish  reserves  for foreseeable  losses.4 To 
be sure,  not  all would  agree  with  such  dire estimates. 
What  is important,  however,  is the  growing  consen- 
sus  that  the  financial  difficulties  associated  with 
federal  deposit  insurance  are not  confined  to the  thrift 
industry  and  the  FSLIC  alone. 
Current  Initiatives 
By now  it is recognized  that  further  deterioration 
in  the  financial  condition  of  the  federal  deposit  in- 
surance  funds  could  have  potentially  devastating 
consequences  for  the  taxpayer.  In  response,  the 
executive  and  legislative  branches,  along  with  the 
federal  bank  and  thrift  regulatory  agencies,  have 
already  proposed  measures  to deal with the problem. 
The  proposals  range  in scope  from  changes  in capital 
requirements  to  a  complete  overhaul  of  the  thrift 
industry’s  regulatory  structure.  Three  01 the  more 
noteworthy  are  described  below. 
Risk-based  capital  In  the  summer  of  1988, 
representatives  of  twelve  major  industrial  nations 
agreed  on  a uniform  set  of  bank  capital  guidelines 
based  on the  riskiness  of a bank’s  asset  portfolio.  In 
the  United  States,  banks  and bank  holding  companies 
will  phase  in  risk-based  capital  guidelines  through 
1992.  While  one  may  argue  with  specifics  of the  pro- 
posal,  it  clearly  marks  an  advance  over  previous 
regulation  of banks  for  at least  three  reasons.  First, 
it places  implicit  costs  on certain  risky  activities.  This 
makes  banks  internalize  some  of the  costs  of taking 
on added  risk while  at the  same  time  allowing  banks 
more  flexibility  than  under  direct  regulation.  Second, 
4  Shadow  Financial  Regulatory  Committee,  “The  Need  to 
Estimate  the  True  Economic  Condition  of  the  FDIC,”  State- 
ment  No.  36,  December  5,  1988. 
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that  do  not  appear  on  the  balance  sheet  of  a bank 
or  holding  company.  Finally,  because  it represents 
a uniform  international  standard,  it permits  regulators 
to  impose  stricter  capital  standards  without  placing 
banks  at a regulatory  disadvantage  relative  to foreign 
competitors. 
&Z&J intervention  In December  1988,  the  Federal 
Home  Loan  Bank  Board  proposed  a rule  that  would 
allow  the  Bank  Board  to  close  a thrift  institution  if 
its  net  worth  had  declined  to  1.5  percent5  The 
rationale  for  the  proposal  is  to  facilitate  early 
intervention  in  the  event  of  an  insolvency  to  pre- 
vent  a troubled  institution  from  plunging  more  deeply 
into the  red.  Such  authority  would  be a clear enhance- 
ment  of the  ability of regulators  to protect  the  deposit 
insurance  fund  since  it would  allow the  regulators  to 
act  rather  than  force  them  to  wait  until  net  worth 
under  regulatory  accounting  principles  goes  below 
zero.  While  one  might  object  that  the  1.5  percent 
regulatory  net  worth  threshold  is too  low  given  the 
distortions  inherent  in  regulatory  accounting  prin- 
ciples,6  the  proposal  is clearly  a  step  toward  more 
effective  regulation. 
More  recently,  Comptroller  of  the  Currency 
Robert  L.  Clarke  advanced  a new  policy  that  would 
result  in the  more  prompt  closing  of national  banks. 
Under  the  old  policy,  national  banks  were  declared 
insolvent  only  after primary  regulatory  capital,  which 
consists  essentially  of  shareholder  equity  plus  loan 
loss reserves,  reached  zero.  This  means  banks  were 
only  closed  well  after  shareholder  equity  fell  below 
zero.  Under  the  new  proposal,  however,  national 
banks  would  be  declared  insolvent  once  shareholder 
equity  falls  to  zero.’ 
72~ Financial  hstzhtion  Reform,  Recovery and  En- 
forcement  Act  On  February  6,  1989,  the  Bush 
administration  announced  a legislative  proposal  detail- 
ing  a  set  of  wide-ranging  reform  and  recovery 
measures  to  deal  with  the  deposit  insurance  fund 
crisis.  The  proposed  legislation,  titled  The  Finan- 
cial Institution  Reform,  Recovery  and  Enforcement 
Act  (FIRREA),  is now  under  consideration  by  Con- 
gress.  Proposed  reforms  include: 
s  Federa  Register,  January  10,  1989,  pp.  826-30. 
6 “Statement  of  the  Shadow  Financial  Regulatory  Committee 
on  Risk-Based  Capital  and  Early  Intervention  Proposal  of  the 
Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board,”  February  13,  1989. 
7 “Remarks  by  Robert  L.  Clarke,  Comptroller  of  the  Cur- 
rency,  before  the  Annual  Convention  of the  Independent  Bank- 
ers  Association  of America,”  Comptroller  of the  Currency  News 
Release,  March  1,  1988. 
Creation  of a new  deposit  insurance  fund  for  the 
thrift  industry  under  the  authority  of  FDIC. 
Creation  of a Resolution  Trust  Corporation  to take 
over  the  resolution  of  all thrift  insolvency  cases 
from  the  FSLIC. 
Creation  of a Resolution  Funding  Corporation  with 
the  authority  to borrow  up to $50  billion to resolve 
current  insolvencies. 
Reorganization  of  the  thrift  industry’s  regulatory 
structure.  The  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board 
would  be  abolished  and  only  the  Chairman  of the 
Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  System  would  remain. 
The  Chairman  would  be  placed  under  the  over- 
sight  of  the  Treasury  Department  as is now  the 
case  with  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency. 
Boards  of  Directors  of  Federal  Home  Loan 
Banks  will  be  modeled  after  those  of  Federal 
Reserve  Banks. 
Uniform  capital  requirements  for banks  and  thrift 
institutions.  Thrifts  have  until  mid-1991  to  have 
capital  up  to  6 percent  of assets.  Further,  capital 
requirements  will  be  based  on  riskiness  of 
investments. 
Increased  deposit  insurance  premiums  for  both 
banks  and  thrifts. 
Uniform  accounting  and  disclosure  standards  for 
banks  and  thrifts. 
Allowing  bank  holding  companies  to  acquire 
healthy  thrifts. 
In addition,  the  FDIC  has already  entered  into  a con- 
tract  with  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  to 
place  the  worst  of  the  insolvent  thrifts  into  con- 
servatorship  until  final  resolution. 
The  administration’s  program  is  important  for 
several  reasons.  First,  it will provide  badly  needed 
funding  to  close  or recapitalize  the  worst  of the  cur- 
rent  crop  of  insolvent  thrifts.  Second,  it  admini- 
stratively  separates  the  federal  thrift  chartering  agency 
(the  FHLBB)  from  the  industry’s  deposit  insurance 
agency  and severs  the  close ties between  the  regulator 
(the  Federal  H ome  Loan  Banks)  and  the  regulated 
industry  (thrifts).  Many  observers  have  concluded 
that  at least  part  of the  industry’s  current  problems 
can  be  attributed  to  lax  regulation  arising  from  the 
close  ties.  Third,  it brings  more  uniform  regulatory 
and  accounting  standards  to  all insured  depository 
organizations.  Under  the  administration’s  plan,  no one 
class  of institutions  will receive  more  favorable  treat- 
ment  than  another.  Finally,  it  shores  up  the  finan- 
cial condition  of the  federal  deposit  insurance  funds. 
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cies  more  promptly. 
The need&r  reform  Treasury  Secretary  Nicholas 
Brady’s statement  describing  the  administration’s  plan 
contains  the  following  desiderata: 
“Never  again  should  we  allow  a federal  insurance 
fund  that  protects  depositors  to become  insolvent. 
Never  again  should  we  allow  insolvent  federally 
insured  deposit  institutions  to  remain  open  and 
operate  without  sufficient  private  capital  at  risk. 
Never  again  should  we  allow  risky  activities  per- 
mitted  by  the  states  to put  the  federal  deposit  in- 
surance  funds  in jeopardy.“8 
In other  words,  it is not  sufficient  to simply  deal with 
the  current  crisis.  On  the  contrary,  it  is necessary 
to  ensure  that  there  are  no  repetitions  of what  hap- 
pened  to  the  savings  and  loan  industry. 
The  administration  plan  is an important  first  step 
toward  eliminating  the  possibility  of  such  a  recur- 
rence,  but  it also recognizes  the  need  for  additional 
measures  to  ensure  the  financial  stability  of insured 
depository  institutions.  It calls  for  a comprehensive 
study  of the  deposit  insurance  system  by the  federal 
bank  and  thrift  regulatory  agencies.  Thus,  one  may 
expect  a continuing  public  debate  over  the  role  of 
deposit  insurance  and  reform  of the  bank  regulatory 
system  even  after  the  sweeping  legislation  is enacted. 
In  an  attempt  to  provide  some  current  perspective 
on these  subjects,  this  paper  will examine  a number 
of different  proposed  reforms.  The  ensuing  discus- 
sion will cover  some  of the  more  noteworthy  reform 
proposals  advanced  by academic  economists  as well 
as  those  advanced  by  the  federal  bank  and  thrift 
regulatory  agencies.  Before  looking  at the  specific pro- 
posals,  however,  it is helpful  to review  more  generally 
the  goals of bank  regulation  and the  limits of just what 
such  regulation  can  reasonably  be  expected  to 
accomplish. 
Regulatory  Reform 
Deposit  insurance:  K&y  @CVZ is needed  Federal 
deposit  insurance  lessens  the  incentive  of depositors 
to run  on banks  when  they  hear  of impending  prob- 
lems  at particular  institutions.  As a result,  it has been 
widely  credited  with  stabilizing  the  banking  system 
and making  it safer.  Indeed,  for its first forty-five  years 
or  so  the  system  appeared  to  work  as  intended. 
8 “Statement  by the  Secretary  of the  Treasury  Nicholas  F.  Brady 
regarding  the  President’s  Savings  and  Loan  Reform  Program,” 
News  Release,  Department  of the  Treasury,  February  6,  1989. 
But  there  is  a  paradox  inherent  in  deposit  in- 
surance.  By  making  banks9  safer  for  individual  de- 
positors,  the  banking  system  as  a  whole  has  been 
made  less  safe.  Among  private  insurers  it is widely 
recognized  that  insuring  an individual  against  the  risk 
of loss  lessens  the  insured’s  incentive  to  attempt  to 
prevent  the  loss  from  occurring.  This  tendency  is 
known  as moralkurd.  Moral  hazard  arises  in con- 
nection  with  deposit  insurance  because  depositors 
are relieved  of the  need  to pay  close  attention  to the 
safety  of their  banks.  This  in turn  removes  some  of 
the  discipline  that  otherwise  would  inhibit  bank 
owners  and managers  from  engaging  in practices  that 
threaten  the  soundness  of their  individual  institutions 
and  thus  the  deposit  insurance  system. 
When  banks  and  thrifts  have  access  to  insured 
funds,  their  “downside”  risk  is limited  because  they 
can  easily  fund  risky  investments  and  loans  by  issu- 
ing insured  deposits.  The  incentive  for excessive  risk 
taking  exists  because  bank  shareholders  do not  bear 
the  full cost  of the  risks  assumed  by  the  bank.  If the 
bank  fails,  shareholders  bear  only  part  of  the  cost. 
The  rest  is borne  by  the  deposit  insurance  funds. 
But if the  outcome  is favorable,  shareholders  collect 
all the  profits.  Because  a substantial  portion  of  the 
risk can  be  shifted  to the  deposit  insurance  funds  in 
such  a manner,  bank  managers  have  incentives  to 
engage  in excessively  risky  behavior.  And  this incen- 
tive  is most  pronounced  among  institutions  that  are 
either  approaching  insolvency  or  are  already  insol- 
vent.  Under  the  current  system,  such  institutions 
have  little  to lose  and everything  to gain from  taking 
on large  risks  in a desperate  attempt  to restore  finan- 
cial solvency  before  they  are taken  over  by regulators. 
In  the  absence  of  deposit  insurance,  depositors 
would  be  exposed  to losses  in the  event  of a failure. 
They  therefore  would  have  the  incentive  to restrain 
banks  engaged  in  risky  behavior  by  demanding  a 
premium  reflecting  the  risk  associated  with  a bank’s 
activities  or,  in  cases  of  impending  insolvency,  by 
withdrawing  deposits.  Indeed,  virtually  all firms  are 
forced  to borrow  money  at one  time  or another  and 
are subject  to such  discipline  by their  creditors  when 
they  do. 
But deposit  insurance  makes  banks  the  exception 
since  depositors  could  enjoy  the  high  rates  but  not 
have  to consider  withdrawing  their  insured  deposits. 
This  is most  obvious  in the  case  of deposit  brokers 
who  move  deposits  of less than  $100,000  around  the 
country  in  search  of  high  returns  in  insured  banks 
regardless  of condition.  Thus  any attempt  to preserve 
9  In  the  remainder  of  the  article,  “bank”  refers  to  all types  of 
depository  institutions. 
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to  counterbalance  the  incentives  created  by  moral 
hazard. 
The  moral  hazard  problem  is particularly  acute  now 
because  of  the  widespread  and  justified  perception 
that  deposit  insurance  covers  virtually  all deposits, 
especially  for large  banks.  The  discipline  that  might 
be  expected  from  uninsured  depositors  is therefore 
lacking.  More  seriously,  recent  attempts  to  resolve 
some  large  bank  failures  have  pointed  to  the  diffi- 
culties  of imposing  costs  even  on bank  holding  com- 
pany  debt  holders.  As a result,  no one  source  of bank 
funds  is likely  to  bear  the  full costs  arising  from  the 
risks  a bank  takes.  In fact,  under  the  current  system 
of de  facto  100  percent  deposit  insurance  coverage 
virtually  all parties  except  the  insurance  funds  benefit 
from  the  higher  risk. 
Nmpmmfi&~oshry  institlltionc  Most  proposals 
for  banking  reform  include  granting  depository  in- 
stitutions  additional  powers  such  as securities  under- 
writing,  real estate  investment,  and  insurance.  A ra- 
tionale  for the  new  powers  is that  bank  safety  might 
be  enhanced  by  allowing  banks  to  diversify  their  in- 
come  sources  among  more  financial  activities.  As a 
quid  pro  quo  for the  new  powers,  the  proposals  sug- 
gest,  for example,  increased  regulation  by the  Federal 
Reserve,‘0  increased  regulation  by  the  FDIC  plus  a 
system  of “firewalls,“”  and  subordinated  debt  with 
firewalls.  l* 
Under  the  current  deposit  insurance  system,  how- 
ever,  there  are  insufficient  incentives  for  banks  to 
control  risks  even  in traditional  commercial  banking 
activities.  While  permitting  banks  and  thrifts  to 
engage  in a larger  and  more  diversified  group  of ac- 
tivities  could  theoretically  work  toward  reducing  risk, 
the  benefits  from  diversification  might  not  be  suffi- 
cient  to  overcome  the  moral  hazard  problem.  For 
example,  in  the  early  1980s  Congress  gave  thrifts 
more  liberal  investment  and  commercial  lending 
powers  but  did  not  impose  any  additional  measures 
to  monitor  and  regulate  how  the  thrifts  used  their 
new powers.  The  results  of ignoring  the  moral  hazard 
are  manifest  in  today’s  thrift  crisis. 
Most  proposals  to  grant  depository  institutions 
additional  powers  do  little  if anything  to  change  the 
incentives  in the  current  system.  Increased  regula- 
10 E.  Gerald  Corrigan,  “Financial  Market  Structure:  A Longer 
View,”  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New  York,  1986 Antma/  Report, 
February  1987. 
I*  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation,  “Mandate  for Change: 
Restructuring  the  Banking  Industry,”  (Draft)  August  1988. 
12 Silas  Keehn,  “Banking  on  the  Balance:  Powers  and  the 
Safety  Net,”  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Chicago,  1989. 
tion  might  limit  risk  to  some  extent,  but  it  often 
invites  attempts  to  evade  restrictions.  And  even  if 
new  activities  were  separated  from  banks  by firewalls, 
the  inducement  to  shift  risks  to  insured  affiliates 
where  possible  would  still be  present.  Finally,  if in- 
sured  depository  institutions  involved  in the  new  ac- 
tivities experience  increased  failures,  the federal  safety 
net,  which  includes  federal  deposit  insurance  and the 
Federal  Reserve  discount  window,  could  be  called 
upon  to  assist  firms  other  than  banks  and  thrifts. 
Nevertheless,  the  trend  toward  deregulation  ap- 
pears  inevitable.  It  is only  a matter  of  time  before 
depository  institutions  are  given  increased  powers. 
But  given  the  incentives  inherent  in  the  current 
system  plus  the  potential  risks  connected  with  new 
activities,  it is important  that  deposit  insurance  reform 
be  considered  at the  same  time  as new  powers.  As 
experience  with  deregulation  of  the  thrift  industry 
has  demonstrated,  increased  powers  without  corre- 
sponding  measures  to  rein  in tendencies  toward  un- 
due  risks  can  invite  disaster. 
Prin@s  of a@otit instrance ?zyimn: Th  rnb ofregtlkz- 
tion and market disc~ipline  Federal  deposit  insurance 
was  not  intended  to  end  all bank  failures.  Rather, 
it  was  intended  to  facilitate  the  quick  and  orderly 
resolution  of bank  failures  so  as to  limit  the  impact 
of any  one  insolvency  on the  financial  system.13  But 
perhaps  too  much  is now  expected  of deposit  insur- 
ance.  Policymakers  must  recognize  that  moral  hazard 
is endemic  to the  deposit  insurance  system  and  that 
it  leads  some  bankers  to  take  risks  they  would  be 
prevented  from  taking  were  deposits  not  insured. 
Risks  connected  with  deposit  insurance  can  be 
dealt  with  in two  ways.  The  first  is direct regulation 
of  risks  through  rule  making  and  supervision.  In 
essence,  the  regulatory  approach  is designed  to com- 
pel  bankers  to  act  in ways  beneficial  to  the  deposit 
insurance  system.  By providing  a means  of monitor- 
ing  and  restraining  risks  taken  by  insured  banks, 
regulation  of banking  can  serve  the  purpose  of reduc- 
ing  risks  arising  from  the  moral  hazard  inherent  in 
insured  banking.  The  second  way  of  dealing  with 
risks  is ma&et discipline, that  is, creation  of incentives 
for  depository  institutions  to  control  risks  on  their 
own.  In  contrast  to  direct  regulation,  market 
discipline  seeks  to make  it in the  economic  interests 
of bankers  to  act  in ways  consistent  with  preserva- 
tion  of the  deposit  insurance  funds  by making  market 
participants  bear  more  of  the  costs  resulting  from 
risky  activities. 
I3  See  Walker  F.  Todd,  “Lessons  of the  Past  and  Prospects  for 
the  Future  in Lender  of Last  Resort  Theory,”  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  Cleveland  Working  Paper  8805  (August  1988). 
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failures  and  the  heavy  losses  those  failures  have  im- 
posed  on  the  federal  deposit  insurance  funds 
sometimes  leads  to calls for a return  to the  regulatory 
environment  of the  1950s.  Although  it is important 
to reexamine  the  adequacy  of the  present  regulatory 
system,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  a return 
to  the  regulatory  environment  of the  past  holds  the 
answer  to  the  industry’s  present  problems.  Regula- 
tion  can  take  several  forms,  and  not  all regulation 
of banking  can  be easily  rationalized  from  the  stand- 
point  of maintaining  the  safety  and  soundness  of the 
banking  system. 
One  form  is  geographical  regulation,  which  at- 
tempts  to  limit  where  banks  may  do business.  Such 
regulation,  which  in  practice  takes  the  form  of 
branching  restrictions  and  limits  on  interstate  bank- 
ing,  is increasingly  viewed  as protecting  banks  and 
thrifts  from  competition  while  doing  little  if anything 
to  enhance  safety  and  soundness.  If anything,  such 
restrictions  might  make  banks  less safe because  they 
tend  to  concentrate  loans  in one  area  and  limit  the 
ability  to gather  deposits.  Consequently,  geographical 
restrictions  have  been  falling  rapidly  throughout  the 
1980s  and no one  has seriously  proposed  reinstating 
them. 
Another  form  of regulation  places  limits on interest 
rates  banks  may  pay  for deposits.  Other  than  the  ban 
on paying  interest  on demand  deposits,  most  interest 
rate  regulation  was rescinded  in the  early  1980s.  But 
unlike  the  case  with  geographical  regulation,  there 
are  still occasional  calls for  reinstatement  of interest 
rate  regulationi 
It is true  that  interest  rate  deregulation  has  made 
it possible  for  many  mismanaged  institutions  to  at- 
tract  funds  for  excessively  rapid  growth,  and  for 
others  to  engage  in undue  risk  taking.  But  calls  for 
interest  rate  reregulation  attack  a  symptom  rather 
than  a cause  of the  current  problems.  In fact,  interest 
rate  restrictions  in an inflationary  environment  were 
largely  responsible  for the  disintermediation  of funds 
in the  late  1970s.  Reregulating  interest  rates  would 
have  the  unfortunate  effect  of  penalizing  well- 
managed  institutions  by  tying  their  hands  while 
depositors  in  search  of  higher  rates  move  funds  to 
less-regulated  competitors. 
While  geographical  and interest  rate  regulations  are 
not  promising  ways  to control  moral  hazard  in bank- 
14 For  example,  a rationale  often  given  for  reimposing  interest 
rate  regulation  is that  allowing  banks  and  thrifts  to use  high  rates 
to  compete  for  funds  leads  them  to  seek  out  riskier  loans  and 
investments  that  hold  out  the  promise  of  covering  the  in- 
creased  cost  of funds.  See,  for  example,  Letters  to  the  Editor, 
T/l  WaflSmet  Journal:  February  22,  1989. 
ing, two  other  forms  of regulation  are still very  much 
with  us. One  is product  regulation,  which  limits what 
banks  may  sell.  While  many  proposals  have  been 
made  to deregulate  depository  institution  product  of- 
ferings,  few institutions  have  actually  been  given  new 
powers.  As noted  earlier,  however,  it  is widely  ex- 
pected  that  product  restrictions  will fall over  the  next 
few  years.  And  given  the  apparently  substantial  in- 
centives  for banks  to evade  product  regulation,  failure 
to  explicitly  deregulate  product  offerings  may  invite 
de facto  product  deregulation  by means  of loopholes 
in the  law and  “forum  shopping”  for  a sympathetic 
regulator. 
The  other  form  of regulation  in place  today,  and 
the  one  most  heavily  relied  upon,  is supervision  and 
examination  of  banking  organizations  in  order  to 
monitor  and control  risks.  Such regulation  is expected 
to  continue  under  virtually  all reform  proposals. 
The  goal of bank  supervision  and regulation  should 
be to protect  the  banking  system  and the  deposit  in- 
surance  funds  by deterring  excessive  risks  and fraud. 
The  goal should  not  be to deter  all failures.  As Presi- 
dent  E. Gerald  Corrigan  of the  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of  New  York  has  pointed  out,  “the  freedoms  con- 
templated  by the  current  market  environment  must 
include  the  freedom  to fail.“‘5 Bank  regulation,  then, 
should  seek  to  monitor  banks  so  problems  can  be 
corrected  or  an  institution  reorganized  or  closed 
before  it becomes  costly  to its deposit  insurance  fund. 
But,  if recent  experience  is any  guide,  regulation 
by  itself  cannot  solve  the  moral  hazard  problem.  It 
is simply  asking  too  much  of any group  of regulatory 
bodies  to  be  the  sole  barrier  against  disaster  when 
the  system  itself  seems  to reward  those  who  engage 
in unduly  risky  activities.  Further,  any  attempts  to 
strengthen  depository  institution  regulation  will run 
up against  a simple  fact.  Regulation  is costly.  A look 
at the  total  regulatory  budgets  bears  this  point  out. 
In  1988,  total  expenses  for  federal  and  state  bank 
regulatory  agencies  amounted  to just over  $1 billion.i6 
No  one  contends  that  the  amount  spent  on  bank 
and  thrift  regulation  is excessive  in view  of the  risks 
is  Corrigan,  op.cit.,  p.  50. 
16 The  estimated  expense  for  the  Office  of the  Comptroller  of 
the  Currency,  which  regulates  national  banks,  was $229  million. 
The  supervision  and  regulation  budget  for  the  Federal  Reserve 
Svstem.  which  regulates  bank  holding  comoanies  and  state 
chartered  banks  that  are  members  of ;he  System,  was  $211 
million.  The  FDIC.  which  reaulates  state  banks  not  in  the 
Federal  Reserve  System,  budieted  $167  million,  while  the 
Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  budgeted  $225  million.  Finally,  the 
state  bank  and  thrift  regulatory  agencies  budgeted  $182  million. 
All regulatory  agencies  except  the  Federal  Reserve  charge  for 
supervision  and regulation,  so most  of the  costs  are borne  directly 
by  banks. 
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likely  to increase  the  costs  of regulation  even  further. 
One  way  to  lessen  such  costs  is  to  develop  such 
regulatory  tools  as risk-based  capital  requirements, 
which  levies  implicit  costs  rather  than  impose  explicit 
regulatory  constraints  on  risky  activities.  But  the 
additional  costs  connected  with  new  powers  could 
be  reduced  even  more  with  measures  that  are  self- 
enforcing  rather  than  enforced  by  regulatory 
authorities.  If such  measures  could  be  put  in place, 
regulators  could  concentrate  on  the  problem  cases 
while  spending  relatively  less  time  on  well-run 
institutions. 
Ma&et  discipline  Safety  and  soundness  might  be 
enhanced  if,  as a complement  to  direct  regulation, 
policies  and rules  could  be developed  that  would  give 
insured  depository  institutions  incentives  to  volun- 
tarily  act  in ways  that  make  the  system  safer.  Such 
measures  fall under  the  rubric  of market  discipline. 
While  direct  regulation  compels  a depository  institu- 
tion  to  change  its behavior  from  what  its economic 
interest  might  otherwise  dictate,  market  discipline 
makes  it  in  an  institution’s  economic  interest  to 
temper  risk-taking  behavior.  Stated  another  way, 
market  discipline  is  a  self-enforcing  variety  of 
regulation. 
But  market  discipline  is meaningless  unless  it  is 
enforced.  In particular,  any attempt  to impose  market 
discipline  must  ultimately  include  the  possibility  of 
failure.  No  institution  should  consider  itself  exempt 
from  closing  or reorganization  if it becomes  insolvent. 
If an institution’s  creditors  believe  they  will be rescued 
from  failure,  they  will have  little  incentive  to monitor 
risks  and  every  incentive  to  tolerate  risky  behavior. 
But  if creditors  face  a  real  possibility  of  loss,  they 
might  be more  inclined  to keep  a close watch  on what 
bank  managers  are doing.  While  such  discipline  might 
not  be  sufficient  to  replace  supervision  and  regula- 
tion,  it would  certainly  help  the  regulators  in their 
job  by exerting  additional  pressure  on bank  managers 
to  run  their  institutions  in  ways  that  are  beneficial 
to  depositors  and  creditors. 
When  searching  for the  optimal  mixture  of market 
discipline  and  regulation,  it  should  be  emphasized 
that  the  purpose  of  market  discipline  is  to  make 
failures  less likely  by  making  them  a real possibility. 
But  this  implies  that  some  institutions  may  allow 
themselves  to  be  operated  in  an  unsafe  manner. 
Regulation  and  supervision  should  focus  on  those 
institutions. 
Deposit  insurance  reform,  then,  has  two  sides. 
First,  market  discipline  involves  rules  that  clearly 
outline  the  consequences  of unsafe  behavior  and that 
ensure  that  accurate  information  about  an institution’s 
condition  can  reach  the  public.  And  for  market 
discipline  to  be  meaningful,  bank  shareholders  and 
creditors  of  a failed  institution  must  bear  the  brunt 
of the  costs  resulting  from  insolvency.  Second,  it is 
the  responsibility  of the  regulatory  authority  to pre- 
vent  the  insolvency  from  inflicting  severe  losses  on 
the  deposit  insurance  fund.  Thus  regulatory  reform 
must  begin  with new policies  governing  the way bank 
insolvencies  are  handled. 
Bank  Failure  Resolution 
Market  economies  are characterized  by continuous 
change.  Every  day  new  firms  start  up  while  others 
fail. But bank  failures  have  always presented  a special 
problem  for policymakers.  Because  bank  deposits  are 
used  to  settle  transactions  among  third  parties,  they 
have  the  potential  to  disrupt  commercial  activities 
and  can  hamper  the  normal  operations  of other  sol- 
vent  banks.  Nevertheless,  as long as banking  remains 
a private  activity  whose  owners  are permitted  to profit 
from  calculated  risk  taking,  some  banks  will  occa- 
sionally  fail. 
Under  the  current  system,  bank  regulators  do not 
normally  close  an institution  until its regulatory  capital 
has been  exhausted  so economic  net  worth  has  long 
since  gone  negative.  As a result,  the  insurance  fund 
is exposed  to  at least  three  severe  problems.  First, 
it  is likely  the  insolvent  institution  is taking  in less 
income  than  it is paying  out  as interest  expense.  The 
longer  the  institution  stays open,  the  longer  the  losses 
can  grow.  Second  and  more  serious,  the  managers 
of a troubled  institution  face  the  temptation  of mak- 
ing extremely  risky  loans  in the  hopes  that  the  pro- 
jects  they  fund will succeed  and thereby  generate  high 
returns.  But  by  definition,  risky  projects  also  carry 
a high probability  of losses,  losses that  must  ultimately 
be  covered  by  the  deposit  insurer  and  perhaps  by 
unsecured  creditors.  Third,  uninsured  depositors, 
such  as  they  exist  nowadays,  have  time  either  to 
withdraw  their  funds  or else  to  cover  their  deposits 
with  offsetting  loans  from  the  insolvent  institution. 
The  growing  number  of  bank  failures  in  recent 
years  has  made  plain  the  need  for  a better  way  of 
handling  such  failures.  The  question  bank  regulators 
are  left  with  is how  to  handle  such  failures  without 
creating  undue  disruption. 
,?%r& CL&HZ  One  way of doing  this is to establish 
policies  that  facilitate  the  closure  of  insured  banks 
before  they  actually  become  insolvent.  Generally, 
early  closure  proposals  would  authorize  bank  regu- 
lators  to  close  an  institution  before  the  economic 
value  of its net  worth  became  negative.  Ideally  such 
a policy  would  prevent  bank  insolvencies  from  in- 
8  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  MAY/JUNE  1989 flitting  severe  losses  on the  deposit  insurance  funds. 
The  effect  would  be  to  reduce  moral  hazard  by 
denying  managers  of  failing  banks  the  option  of 
gambling  with  insured  deposits. 
One  feasible  alternative  to  the  current  method  of 
dealing  with  bank  insolvencies  has  been  proposed 
by Professors  Benston  and Kaufman.‘7  Their  proposal 
contains  two  major  elements  that  incorporate  the 
principles  of market  discipline  and regulatory  reform. 
First,  adopt  market  value  accounting  to  identify 
problem  institutions  before  net  worth  becomes 
negative.  Second,  mandate  that  institutions  be 
reorganized  or closed  if regulatory  capital  (measured 
as estimated  market  value  of assets  minus  estimated 
market  value  of unsubordinated  debt)  falls below  a 
prespecified  level.  For  example,  a depository  institu- 
tion  could  face  mandatory  reorganization  when  its 
capital  ratio  falls  below  three  percent. 
The  “bridge  bank”  authority  granted  by Congress 
to  the  deposit  insurance  agencies  already  provides 
a means  for regulators  to place  insolvent  institutions 
into  receivership  and to continue  operating  the  insti- 
tutions  until  a buyer  can  be  found.  To  implement 
the  policy  proposed  by Professors  Benston  and Kauf- 
man,  regulators  would  need  clear  legal  authority  to 
place  an insured  institution  into  such  a receivership 
and  to  reorganize  it  before  it  actually  becomes  in- 
solvent.  Whether  such  authority  now  exists  or  else 
requires  legislation  should  become  clearer  over  the 
next  few  years,  especially  if the  deposit  insurance 
funds  are given  the  authority  to revoke  insurance  in 
a  more  expeditious  manner  than  is now  possible. 
Of course,  any  comprehensive  plan must  allow for 
worst  cases.  Even  under  a stated  policy  of reorganiz- 
ing depository  institutions  before  they  turn  insolvent, 
some  institutions  will not  be  closed  before  their  true 
economic  net  worth  becomes  negative.  Continental 
Illinois,  for  example,  surprised  regulators  as well  as 
the  market  when  the  true  magnitude  of their  losses 
became  known.  In  such  a case,  it is important  that 
uninsured  depositors  and other  creditors  be made  to 
bear  losses  associated  with  reorganization.  That  those 
depositors  and  creditors  would  attempt  to  run  or 
otherwise  avoid  losses  makes  prompt  closing  all the 
more  necessary  as soon  as problems  become  known. 
Aqwnents  againstprompt  closing  There  are several 
arguments  against prompt  closing.  The  most  frequent 
is that  many  institutions’  problems  are  the  result  of 
I7  George  Benston  and  George  Kaufman,  “Regulating  Bank 
Safety  and  Performance,”  in Res~mcttilring  Banking  and Financial 
&TV&J  in  America,  ed.  William  S.  Haraf  and  Rose  Marie 
Kushmeider  (Washington,  D.C.:  American  Enterprise  Institute, 
1988),  chap.  3. 
depressed  regional  economies  that  will improve  over 
time.  For  example,  banks  that  lend  heavily  for  real 
estate  development  during  a  boom  suffer  heavily 
when  the  bust  comes.  But  to  accept  the  argument 
that  such  problems  will  disappear  over  time  is  to 
assume  that  the  boom  conditions  are normal  and that 
the  bust  is the  aberration.  It is far  more  likely  that, 
while  some  recovery  of  value  might  occur  as  the 
economy  improves,  the  vast  majority  of  bad  loans 
will still be  bad  in any  but  the  most  vigorous  boom. 
Moreover,  keeping  insured  banks  open  under  such 
a  rationale  effectively  puts  the  bank  regulatory 
agencies  in the  business  of speculating  on real estate 
values,  the  same  activity  responsible  for much  of the 
present  crisis  in  the  thrift  industry.  If the  effect  of 
regional  economic  problems  on  bank  solvency  has 
any  validity,  it  is  in  arguing  against  geographical 
restrictions  on  bank  expansion  rather  than  against 
prompt  closing. 
Another  argument  against  prompt  closing  is that 
shutting  down  an  institution  before  it is technically 
insolvent  could  be  an  unconstitutional  taking  of 
private  property.  While  such  concerns  are not  to be 
dismissed  lightly,  it  is  likely  that  prompt  closing 
would  not  run  afoul  of federal  law or  the  Constitu- 
tion.  First,  the  law authorizes  regulators  to  close  an 
institution  that  is being  operated  in an unsafe  or un- 
sound  manner.  Second,  the  Supreme  Court  may  not 
look  kindly  on  challenges  to  the  constitutionality  of 
a  law  designed  to  protect  the  deposit  insurance 
system  by parties  who  at the  same  time  benefit  hand- 
somely  from  the  system’s  existence.18  The  main 
challenge  is  to  formulate  policies  that  enable 
regulators  to protect  the  deposit  insurance  funds while 
ensuring  that  the  procedure  does  not  violate  rights 
to  due  process. 
Regdamy  initiatves  Policies  of regulatory  forbear- 
ance  have  presented  an obstacle  to the  prompt  clos- 
ing of insolvent  depositories.  For  example,  regulatory 
agencies  may  refrain  from  closing  an  institution 
based  on  a belief  that  if given  time  the  management 
will right  the  problems  that  led  to insolvency.  More 
important,  decisions  to close  institutions  are not made 
in  a  vacuum.  Rather,  they  may  involve  political 
pressure,  explicit  or  implicit,  to  favor  certain  insti- 
tutions.  But  even  if Congress  does  declare  certain 
institutions  off-limits,  it  does  not  diminish  the 
desirability  of quickly  closing  insolvent  institutions. 
It is better  that  some  be  closed  promptly  than  none. 
I8  For  a detailed  analysis  of the  legal basis  for one  early  closure 
proposal,  see  Raymond  Natter,  “Analysis  of  FHLBB’s  Early 
Intervention  Proposal  Suggests  Legal  Basis  for  Plan,”  BAWs 
Banking Repofl,  February  27,  1989,  pp.  484-89. 
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the  option  of extending  regulatory  forbearance,  they 
have  at  the  same  time  proposed  prompt  closing 
policies.  Among  them: 
l The  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  at the  end 
of  1988  requested  comments  on  a proposal  that 
a  thrift  insured  by  FSLIC  could  be  placed  into 
receivership  or conservatorship  if its capital  were 
to fall below  1.5 percent  of total  assets.  The  capital 
level  would  be  sufficient  reason  for  closing,  and 
the  FHLBB  would  not  have  to  make  any  further 
showing  that  the  institution  was  being  operated 
in  an  unsafe  or  unsound  condition.r9 
l The  FDIC  has  suggested  it  be  given  the  author- 
ity  to terminate  deposit  insurance  coverage  for  an 
institution  on  six months’  notice  if the  institution 
appears  to be  operating  in a manner  that  threatens 
the  deposit  insurance  fund.*O Apparently,  the  au- 
thority  could  be exercised  before  market  net  worth 
were  to become  negative.  At present,  the  revoca- 
tion  process  can  last years.  Revoking  deposit  in- 
surance  would  have  the  same  practical  effect  as 
early  closing.  The  FDIC  bases  its  request  for 
streamlined  revocation  powers  on the  desirability 
of an insurer’s  having  the  right  to determine  whom 
it  insures. 
l The  Comptroller  of the  Currency  in March  1989 
proposed  that  a national  bank  be  declared  insol- 
vent  when  its  equity  capital  reaches  zero.al  The 
effect  of  the  proposal  would  be  to  exclude  loan 
loss  reserves  from  capital.  The  rationale  is  that 
loan  loss  reserves  simply  recognize  actual  and 
anticipated  losses  and  do not  represent  net  worth. 
While  not  specifically  a prompt  closing  rule,  the 
proposal  would  move  the  Comptroller’s  policy 
closer  to  prompt  closing. 
Any  of  the  above  rules  would  be  an  improvement 
over  the  current  system.  The  first  two  would  ex- 
plicitly  provide  for  early  intervention  to block  losses. 
Further,  if the  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board 
eventually  were  to require  the  reporting  of bank  assets 
and  liabilities  at market  value,  the  Comptroller’s  pro- 
posed  rule  would  for  all practical  purposes  represent 
a  prompt  closing  rule.  Whatever  one’s  specific 
preferences,  any  of  the  above  would  go a long  way 
toward  protecting  the  deposit  insurance  fund  from 
loss. 
19 Federal Register, vol.  54,  p. 826. 
20 Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation,  Deposit  Insurance  for 
NIX  Nineties: Meeting the Chbnge,  Draft  Executive  Summary, 
January  1989,  p.  18. 
21 “Comptroller’s  Plan  to Change  Equity  Capital  Calculations,” 
American  Banker, March  3,  1989,  p.  10. 
Measures  to  Improve  Bank  Regulation 
Capitalregulation  Recently,  bank  regulators  from 
twelve  industrial  nations  agreed  on a common  set  of 
risk-based  capital  guidelines  for  banks.  Essentially, 
the  guidelines  require  that  more  capital be maintained 
against  relatively  more  risky  activities.  Such  regula- 
tion  represents  an implicit  form  of pricing  and as such 
helps  make  banks  aware  of  the  costs  they  impose 
on the  deposit  insurance  funds.  Of course,  risk-based 
capital  is not  a perfect  solution.  The  risk  categories 
are rather  broad  and seem  a blunt  instrument  for deal- 
ing with  certain  risks.  For  example,  all commercial 
loans  are  placed  in the  same  category  regardless  of 
the  creditworthiness  of the  borrower.  Further,  until 
bank  accounting  conventions  are  revised  to  reflect 
estimates  of market  values,  net  worth  under  the  new 
procedures  might  still be  overstated.  But  while  not 
a panacea,  risk-based  capital  is an improvement  over 
its  predecessor. 
The  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  has  issued 
for comment  a set  of risk-based  capital  guidelines  for 
thrift  institutions.  Their  proposal  specifically  includes 
a component  to  reflect  interest  rate  risk,22 which  if 
adopted  would  represent  an advance  over  the  stan- 
dards  for banks.  More  recently,  the  Bush  administra- 
tion  has  proposed  that  thrifts  be  required  to  meet 
the  same  capital  requirements  as banks.  Both  pro- 
posals  would  represent  an important  complement  to 
existing  regulation.  They  would  enhance  equity  by 
treating  all institutions  alike  and  requiring  that  they 
play  by  the  same  rules.  They  would  enhance  effi- 
ciency  by  increasing  incentives  for depository  institu- 
tions  to  control  risks. 
Because  the  newer  and  more  stringent  capital  re- 
quirements  represent  a significant  departure  from  past 
practices,  they  have  raised  a great  deal  of  concern 
among  many  in the  thrift  industry.a3  Opponents  of 
the  new  capital  standards  contend  that  bringing  their 
capital  ratios  up to 6 percent  by  199 1 would  involve 
an unprecedented  need  to  raise  funds  in the  market 
and  would  drive  many  otherwise  sound  thrifts  out 
of  business.  But  while  meeting  the  new  standards 
would  present  a challenge,  those  standards  would  not 
force  solvent  but  undercapitalized  institutions  out  of 
business.  Instead,  it would  make  it difficult  for  such 
institutions  to continue  supporting  their  current  levels 
of  investment.  One  could  just  as  easily  frame  the 
argument  in terms  of excessive  asset  growth  lever- 
aged  by  insured  deposits  with  too  little  attention  to 
22 Federa~Regi~ter,  December  23,  1988,  pp.  51800-820. 
23 See,  for  example,  “Bush  S&L  Plan  Draws  Heavy  Fire,” 
American Bank,  February  16,  1989;  and  “Experts  Say  Good- 
will  Plan  May  Stun  S&Ls,”  Amtkan  Banker, March  8,  1989. 
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difficult,  thrifts  could  shrink  their  asset  base until their 
ratios  reach  regulatory  minimums.  It is by no  means 
clear  that  the  current  level  of thrift  assets  is consis- 
tent  with  a  financially  sound  thrift  industry. 
Market  value  accozmting  Information  concerning 
the  true  financial  condition  of  banks  could  be 
greatly  improved  if banks  were  required  to  report 
estimates  of  the  market  values  of  their  assets  and 
liabilities.  The  reason  is that  market  values  give  the 
most  accurate  estimate  of  a depository  institution’s 
true  net  worth.  Put  more  simply,  market  values 
reflect  reality  more  closely  than  do  historical  (or 
book)  values.  This  truth  becomes  obvious  in an in- 
solvency,  when  the  ultimate  cost  to  the  deposit 
insurer  is determined  by  the  market  value  of assets 
less  that  of liabilities.  Book  value  of equity  is for  all 
practical  purposes  irrelevant. 
In any banking  system,  changes  in creditworthiness 
or  in interest  rates  might  drive  the  market  value  of 
an institution’s  assets  below  that  of its liabilities.  But 
under  current  regulatory  accounting  standards  the 
change  would  not  be reflected  as such  until  loan loss 
reserves  were  increased,  part  of the  asset  written  off, 
or the  asset  sold. This  is especially  obvious  with long- 
lived  assets  such  as  fixed-rate  mortgage  loans. 
While  market  value  accounting  would  be  a major 
departure  from  current  practice,  it  is already  being 
studied  by at least  two  regulatory  bodies.  First,  given 
the  well-documented  vulnerability  of thrift  institutions 
to interest  rate  risk,  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board 
member  Lawrence  J.  White  has  expressed  interest 
in developing  market  value  accounting  methods  for 
thrifts.Z4  Second,  the  Financial  Accounting  Stan- 
dards  Board  (FASB)  published  a proposal  in  1987 
and  established  a task  force  in early  1989  regarding 
reporting  of  financial  instruments  at  market  values 
or an estimate  thereof.25  Thus  some  form  of market 
value  accounting  eventually  could  be  adopted  for 
depository  institutions. 
Market  value  accounting  would  have  several  ad- 
vantages  for  banking  policy.  First,  making  market 
values  the  standard  for  determining  solvency  would 
reduce  the  potential  losses  borne  by  the  deposit 
insurance  funds.  If regulators  close  a bank  when  its 
z4 Lawrence  J. White,  “Mark-to-Market  Accounting  is Vital  to 
FSLIC  and  Valuable  to Thrifts,”  Ou&o~ of th  FederalHome Loan 
Bank System 4  UanuaryIFebruary  1988),  pp.  20-24. 
25 Pmposed  Statement  of Finankd  Accounting  Standark  Lhk~osur~s 
about  Financed Instnzmen~.  Financial  Accounting  Series,  No.  054. 
Stamford,  Connecticut:  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board, 
November  30,  1987.  See  also  “FASB  Announces  Task  Force 
for  Financial  Instruments  Project,”  BNA’s  Banking  Report, 
February  20,  1989,  pp.  425-26. 
market  value  first  goes  negative  rather  than  waiting 
for  book  value  to  go negative,  further  loss  will have 
been  avoided.  Second,  capital  regulation  will be more 
effective  if net  worth  is  based  on  actual  values  of 
assets  and  liabilities.  Specifically,  measurement  of 
capital  ratios  under  market  value  accounting  would 
account  for interest  rate  risk and imbalances  between 
asset  and  liability  durations.  This  would  be  par- 
ticularly  important  in  the  case  of  thrift  institutions 
making  long-term  mortgage  loans. 
Third,  marking  assets  to  market  would  reduce 
some  perverse  incentives  existing  under  the  present 
system  to sell high quality  assets  to realize  gains while 
retaining  poor  quality  assets  to  avoid  recognizing 
losses.  For  example,  a bank  wishing  to  build  up  its 
capital might  be tempted  to sell a profitable  subsidiary 
in  order  to  realize  the  gain  while  at  the  same  time 
leaving  troubled  loans  on  its  books  rather  than  sell 
them  at  a loss.  Under  market  value  accounting,  in 
contrast,  the  gain in value  of the  profitable  subsidiary 
and loss  on the  loan  would  already  be  recognized  so 
the  bank  would  have  less  incentive  to  sell the  good 
asset. 
Despite  the  desirability  of market  value  account- 
ing,  there  are  reasonable  questions  about  its  feasi- 
bility.  It  might  be  helpful  to  first  consider  areas  in 
which  market  value  accounting  would  present  no 
major  implementation  problems.  First,  securities 
holdings  are  already  reported  at market  value  along 
with book  value in call reports,  so there  is no obstacle 
to  substituting  current  for  historical  values.  Most 
securities  held  in  a bank’s  investment  portfolio  are 
traded  on  active  markets,  so  there  is  virtually  no 
information  problem  in  marking  such  assets  to 
markets.  Indeed,  securities  in trading  accounts  are 
already  marked  to  market. 
Second,  high  quality  loans  of one-year  maturity  or 
less  or with  (at least)  annually  adjustable  rates  could 
be  assumed  to be  at market  value.  Whatever  advan- 
tages  may  accrue  from  marking  such  assets  to market 
are probably  swamped  by the  costs.  Interest  rate  risk 
may  exist  for such  assets,  but  it is limited  by the  early 
repricing  opportunity. 
Third,  loans  for which  a secondary  market  exists, 
such  as  loans  to  developing  countries,  could  be 
marked  to  market.  In  fact,  Salomon  Brothers  and 
Merrill  Lynch  issue  quotes  of market  values  that  are 
reprinted  periodically  in the  Amen’can Banker.  Such 
loans  are  to  a  relatively  small  and  easily  distin- 
guished  class  of borrowers,  each  of which  has  suffi- 
cient  debt  outstanding  to  support  market  trading. 
Interested  parties  sometimes  object  that  market 
values  do  not  represent  the  ultimate  collectable 
amount.  But  such  arguments  are  inconsistent  with 
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in fact  reflects  the  present  value  of what  is expected 
to  be  collected  ultimately.  It  is  unlikely  that  par- 
ticipants  in  such  a  sophisticated  market  would 
systematically  and repeatedly  underestimate  the value 
of  the  debt. 
The  major  area  of  difficulty  for  adopting  market 
value  accounting  is  in  valuing  loans  for  which  no 
secondary  markets  exist. a6 While  interest  rate  risk 
presents  few  practical  difficulties,  loan  quality  is 
another  matter.  Unlike  loans  traded  in a secondary 
market,  most  other  bank  loans  are dispersed  among 
a large  number  of heterogeneous  borrowers.  While 
loans  to  the  largest  corporations  might  easily  be 
valued,  loans  to consumers  and  medium-  and  small- 
sized  businesses  might  not. 
At  present,  loan  loss  reserves  (also  called  valua- 
tion reserves)  help  to move  a bank’s net worth  toward 
market  value.  Generally,  methodologies  for  com- 
puting  such  reserves  are  based  on  percentages  of 
loans  outstanding  in  various  quality  classifications. 
While  somewhat  inexact,  it  does  serve  to  help  off- 
set  the  distortions  of carrying  assets  at book  values. 
A possible  solution  might  be  to  adjust  the  values 
of groups  of assets  rather  than  individual  assets.  At 
present,  banks  are  actively  involved  in  converting 
groups  of  loans,  most  notably  mortgage  and  auto- 
mobile  loans  and  credit  card  receivables,  into 
securities.  When  loans  are packaged  into  securities, 
they  are  priced  to  reflect  certain  assumptions  about 
prepayment  and  default  risks.  In addition,  loan  sales 
between  banks  are  becoming  commonplace.  The 
point  here  is  that  the  knowledge  now  being  de- 
veloped  in the private  sector  could  be used  to develop 
valuation  methodologies.  The  result  might  be similar 
to  the  current  practice  of  offsetting  assets  with 
reserves,  but  the  methodologies  would  be  more 
exact  than  is  now  the  case. 
The  actual  effects  of market  value  accounting  on 
most  banks’  portfolios  could  be  minor  for  those  in- 
stitutions  that  have  followed  conscientious  loan  loss 
reserving  practices.  More  important,  recognizing 
market  values  would  simply  change  the  focus  of 
where  losses  are realized  from  the  income  statement 
to  the  balance  sheet.  That  is,  under  the  current 
system  losses  occur  over  time  as an asset  valued  at 
its historical  cost  suffers  an impaired  income  stream. 
The  result  is a lower  return  on  the  asset.  But  if the 
asset  were  marked  to market,  there  would  be a one- 
time  loss  of value  but  the  income  would  now  reflect 
a “normal”  return  on  the  marked-down  asset. 
z6 See  David  L.  Mengle,  “The  Feasibility  of Market  Value  Ac- 
counting  for  Commercial  Banks,”  Working  Paper,  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond,  June  1989. 
Deposit h.smancepmium  There  are three  signifi- 
cant  aspects  of  deposit  insurance  pricing.  The  first 
is determining  a price  sufficient  to  keep  the  level  of 
insurance  fund  reserves  at  an  adequate  level.  The 
Bush administration  plan to raise premiums  for thrifts 
is in that  spirit.  Further,  the  FDIC  has suggested  that 
it be given  the  authority  to base  rates  on a three-year 
average  of net  loss experience.  The  major  objection 
to  such  authority  is that  across-the-board  rate  hikes 
unfairly  penalize  soundly  run  institutions.  But unless 
the  insurer  can  easily  distinguish  among  banks,  all 
pricing  schemes  (including  the  current  one)  will 
suffer  from  this  deficiency. 
The  second  aspect  of pricing  is basing the  premium 
paid  by  a particular  institution  on  the  riskiness  of its 
activities.  As  with  risk-based  capital,  risk-based 
premiums  could  enhance  equity  and  efficiency  by 
placing  costs  on banks  engaging in activities  perceived 
to  increase  risk  exposure.  Further,  the  risk-based 
component  of the  insurance  premium  would  diminish 
the  perceived  inequities  of adjusting  premiums  across 
the  board  to  reflect  loss  experience. 
Unfortunately,  efforts  to  develop  variable  prices 
have  not  been  encouraging.  The  practical  effect  of 
pricing  schemes  advanced  thus  far  would  be  to 
penalize  losses  after  they  have  been  incurred  rather 
than  to discourage  beforehand  the  behavior  that  leads 
to the  losses.  In other  words,  pricing  proposals  have 
been  based  on after  the  fact  observations  when  their 
stated  purpose  should  be  to  modify  behavior  before 
the  fact. 
Banks  that  engage  in risky  behavior  should  be  re- 
quired  to bear  the  costs  associated  with  those  risks. 
Whether  the  price  of added  risk  should  be  imposed 
explicitly  in the  form  of risk-based  premiums  or im- 
plicitly  in  the  form  of  risk-based  capital  is  essen- 
tially  a  question  of  ease  of  implementation.  While 
feasibility  now  favors  risk-based  capital,  it would  be 
premature  to  abandon  all efforts  to  develop  variable 
premiums. 
A  final  pricing  issue  is  the  base  for  assessing 
premiums.  The  FDIC  has  suggested  that  the  assess- 
ment  base  be  expanded  to  include  secured  borrow- 
ings from,  for example,  Federal  Home  Loan  Banksa 
The  rationale  is  that  such  borrowings  on  the  lia- 
bility  side  are  secured  by  a high  quality  asset  on  the 
asset  side.  As  a  result,  after  a  failure  the  secured 
lenders  would  get away with the  highest  quality  assets 
while the  FDIC  would  be left with more  questionable 
assets. 
The  FDIC  demurred  at  the  opportunity  to  pro- 
pose  including  foreign  deposits  in its rate  base.  The 
z7 FDIC,  op.  cit.,  p.  13. 
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rent  system  of de facto  100 percent  deposit  insurance 
relieves  foreign  depositors  of losses  even  if their  funds 
are  not  explicitly  insured.  Charging  premiums  on 
foreign  deposits  would  simply  recognize  the  reality 
that  foreign  deposits  are  effectively  covered  and 
would  recover  some  of  the  costs  of  the  insurance 
actually  provided.  But  even  if de  facto  100  percent 
insurance  were  scaled  back  to  a  less  generous 
modified  payout  policy  in which  uninsured  depositors 
took  some  losses,  foreign  depositors  would  still 
benefit  from  the  prompt  reorganization  and  imme- 
diate  availability  of all but  a small percentage  of their 
deposits  made  possible  by  deposit  insurance. 
The  argument  against  including  foreign  deposits 
in  the  rate  base  is  that  money  center  banks  with 
significant  foreign  deposits  would  be  handicapped 
relative  to  their  counterparts  in  other  countries 
that  would  not  be  so  charged.  But  the  fact  remains 
that  current  policy  insulates  our  largest  banks  from 
failure  and  that  such  insulation  must  be  worth 
something  to the  banks.  Even  if foreign  countries  sub- 
sidize  their  banks’  competition  with  our  own,  there 
is little  substance  to  the  argument  that  our  largest 
banks  should  be undercharged  for the  protection  they 
get  while  the  vast  majority  of  banks  pick  up  the 
additional  tab. 
State  banking  powen  A  final  regulatory  reform 
issue  involves  conflicts  between  state  and  federal 
authority  over  banking  powers.  Given  the  division 
of  authority  over  banking  between  the  states  and 
the  federal  governments,  it  is inevitable  that  there 
will from  time  to time  arise  some  disagreement  over 
what  powers  depository  institutions  may  prudently 
exercise.  Indeed,  it  is  often  pointed  out  that  the 
most  egregious  examples  of  imprudent  investment 
occurred  in  California  and  Texas,  both  of  which 
allowed  their  state-chartered  thrifts  powers  denied 
their  federally  chartered  brethren. 
Given  that  depository  institutions  are  insured 
federally,  it  makes  sense  to  allow  the  deposit  in- 
surance  funds  veto  power  over  activities  of  state- 
chartered  federally  insured  institutions.  Otherwise, 
federal  authorities  are  limited  in their  ability  to  con- 
trol  their  risk  exposure. 
Market  Discipline 
Short  of stationing  an examiner  in every  bank,  it 
is  difficult  to  conceive  how  direct  supervision  and 
regulation  can  do  the  entire  job  of  ensuring  safety 
and  soundness.  But  it  is  likely  that  if banks  were 
monitored  by  other  parties  in addition  to  regulators 
the  result  would  be  more  timely  spotting  and  cor- 
recting  of  problems. 
One  may  object  that  bank  stockholders  already 
have  incentives  to keep  a close  watch  on the  actions 
of  bank  managers.  But  monitoring  by  shareholders 
is not  enough.  After  all,  they  are  only  liable  up  to 
the  amount  of  their  initial  investment.  If the  bank 
goes  deeply  insolvent,  the  equity  may  be  wiped  out 
but  the  rest  of  the  bill  will  be  divided  among  the 
deposit  insurer  and  unsecured  creditors.  It  seems 
advisable,  therefore,  that  there  should  be  more 
parties  involved  than  just  the  shareholders. 
End  de facto  100 percent  deposit insurance coverage 
Federal  deposit  insurance  was  not  designed  to  pro- 
tect  banks  against  failure.  But most  bank  failures  now 
involve  some  type  of merger  or an even  more  direct 
bailout.  Because  nowadays  all  depositors  and 
sometimes  even  debt  holders  are rescued  from  bear- 
ing any  costs  in an insolvency,  depositors  and  other 
creditors  have  little  reason  to  pay  close  attention  to 
the  condition  of their  banks.  If market  discipline  is 
to  have  any  relevance  to  currenr  policy,  then  it  is 
imperative  that  bank  regulators  pursue  all  bank 
failures  with  rescue  of  insured  depositors  only  in 
mind.  The  sole  exceptions  should  be  cases  in which 
an  institution  is shut  down  before  its  market  value 
of  net  worth  becomes  negative. 
Imposing  market  discipline  on uninsured  depositors 
and creditors  would  have  two  significant  advantages, 
especially  in  the  case  of  a large  bank  failure.  First, 
by  making  it possible  to  close  or  reorganize  institu- 
tions  before  net  worth  dropped  well  below  zero  it 
would  minimize  costs  to the  deposit  insurance  funds. 
Consequently,  it  would  also  minimize  the  burden 
imposed  on  well-run  institutions  through  deposit 
insurance  premiums.  Second,  it  would  provide  an 
added  incentive  for  depositors  and  other  creditors 
to  cooperate  with  the  efforts  of  regulators  to 
reorganize  or  liquidate  troubled  institutions. 
One  objection  to  imposing  depositor  discipline  is 
that  individual  depositors  are  not  in  a  position  to 
monitor  banks  effectively.  The  objection  fails on two 
counts.  First,  banks  are themselves  a major  category 
of  uninsured  depositors.  It  is difficult  to  imagine  a 
group  more  advantageously  situated  to  monitor  a 
bank’s  condition  than  a bank’s  peers.  Second,  given 
that  deposits  of $100,000  and  less  are  insured,  it is 
only  large  depositors  that  would  be expected  to bear 
failure  costs.  Certainly  it is not  unreasonable  to  ex- 
pect  large  depositors  to possess  sufficient  sophistica- 
tion to pay  attention  to the  financial  condition  of their 
banks.28 
*s  The  FDIC  seems  to  be  of two  minds  on  this  issue.  On  one 
hand,  they  do not  believe  in reliance  on  depositor  discipline  due 
to  the  danger  of runs.  On  the  other  hand,  they  do  not  believe 
in  explicit  100  percent  deposit  insurance  coverage  because  it 
would  reduce  market  discipline.  See  FDIC,  op.  cit.,  pp.  14-15. 
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discipline  would  be  to reduce  the  current  $100,000 
per  account  deposit  insurance  coverage.  It is not  cer- 
tain  how  effective  such  a  reduction  would  be, 
however,  since  deposit  brokers  would  probably  be 
able  to  deal  in  smaller  packages  than  the  current 
$100,000  packages  they  now  direct  to  high-paying 
institutions.  The  result  would  depend  on  the  tran- 
sactions  costs  relative  to the  returns  on such deposits. 
A second  method  would  be limiting  deposit  insurance 
for  each  individual  to  the  statutory  amount.  The 
problem  with  such  an  approach  would  be  the  diffi- 
culty  of  enforcing  it  for  almost  20,000  depository 
institutions. 
A more  meaningful  way  to  restore  the  concept  of 
uninsured  deposits  would  be to  return  to  a modified 
payout  policy  in which  uninsured  depositors  receive 
their  funds  less a deduction  to reflect  expected  losses. 
The  depositors  may  receive  further  distributions  if 
the  initial  deduction  turned  out  to  be  overly 
pessimistic.  Such  a  policy  was  actually  used  for 
dealing  with  the  failure  in  1982  of the  Penn  Square 
Bank.  Further,  if a failed  bank  still had  a significant 
franchise,  reorganization  might  be  preferable  to 
liquidation.  The  deposit  insurer  could  in that  event 
use  its “bridge  bank”  authority  to  effectively  create 
a new  banking  organization  from  the  assets  and  re- 
maining  deposits  of the  old.  The  bridge  bank  could 
then  be sold to new  owners.  Thus,  a modified  payout 
policy  need  not  involve  liquidation  of  the  failed 
institution  in  every  case. 
Unfortunately,  the  failure  and rescue  of Continental 
Illinois  in  1984  sounded  a  retreat  from  market 
discipline.  The  Continental  rescue  shows  the  com- 
plications  that  can  arise  when  attempting  to  save  a 
bank  from  failure.  Because  of  covenants  written 
into  the  debt  issued  by  Continental’s  parent  holding 
company,  federal  regulators  were  virtually  forced  to 
rescue  holding  company  creditors  along with the bank 
itself.  In  other  words,  not  only  were  all  deposits 
insured  but so were  other  creditors.  Similar problems 
have  arisen  in Texas  with  First  City  Bancorp.  and 
MCorp.  Only  the  failure  of First  RepublicBank  Corp. 
may  have  been  handled  in such  a way  as to  expose 
debt  holders  to losses.  Only  time  will tell if the  FDIC 
will prevail  against  the  litigation  of  First  Republic’s 
creditors. 
Making  market discipline crzdibie  Given  the  prob- 
lems  with  the  implicit  guarantees  of  bank  holding 
company  debt,  it  is  necessary  that  means  be  de- 
vised  to expose  both  uninsured  depositors  and  bank 
holding  company  creditors  to  the  threat  of  loss.  In 
particular,  it would  be  helpful  to  develop  and  make 
public  a  policy  statement  with  the  following  two 
elements: 
l  An outline  of the  procedure  to  be  followed  in the 
event  of a large  bank  failure,  including  a descrip- 
tion  of  treatment  of  uninsured  depositors. 
l  An explicit  statement  that  there  is no  protection 
for  bank  or  bank  holding  company  stockholders 
or  bank  holding  company  creditors,  even  for 
large  companies.  Especially  in  the  light  of  a re- 
cent  Federal  District  Court  decision  regarding 
MCorp  in Texas,a9  such  a policy  might  require 
legislation  to  make  it  effective. 
Such  a policy  would  be  helpful  in two  ways.  First, 
it  would  enable  the  public  to  plan  their  actions  on 
the  basis  of  known  government  policy  rather  than 
engage  in a guessing  game  regarding  regulators’  in- 
tentions.  Second,  as an explicitly  outlined  procedure 
it would  be  more  credible  than  would  any policy  that 
relied  heavily  on  the  discretionary  powers  of  regu- 
latory  agencies.  If the  policy  were  credible,  it would 
be  more  likely  to  affect  behavior  in the  market  than 
would  a policy  in which  regulators  were  always  ex- 
pected  to  flinch  when  standing  face  to  face  with  a 
major  failure. 
One  way  to  make  policy  with  respect  to  bank 
failures  more  credible  would  be  to  place  legal  limits 
on  the  discretion  regulators  could  exercise  in  deal- 
ing with  insolvent  banks.  At present,  banks  are  not 
subject  to  bankruptcy  law in the  same  way  as other 
firms.  A  failing  bank  does  not  enter  bankruptcy 
proceedings  administered  by  the  judicial  system. 
Instead,  a bank  is declared  insolvent  by  its  charter- 
ing agency,  which  typically  places  the  failed bank  into 
a receivership  under  the  auspices  of the  deposit  in- 
surance  agency.  3o To  be  sure,  depositors  and  other 
creditors  who  feel  they  have  been  dealt  with  un- 
justly  by the  deposit  insurance  agency  have  recourse 
to the  courts.  But the judicial  system  currently  lacks 
the  mandate  to  limit  initial  payouts  to  insured 
depositors  only.  Given  that  case  law  has  not  been 
clear  on  the  issue,  such  a mandate  would  probably 
require  legislation. 
Dotsey  and  Kuprianov3’  argue  in favor  of placing 
bank  failures  under  the  jurisdiction  of the  courts  to 
ensure  that  the  deposit  insurance  agencies  be limited 
to paying  not  more  than  the  legally  insured  amount, 
which  is now  $100,000  per  account.  Once  an insured 
29  MCorp v. Board of Govemon of the Federal Reseme System,  DC 
STexas,  No.  89-1677,  June  9,  1989. 
30 See  George  Benston,  Robert  A. Eisenbeis,  Paul  M.  Horvitz, 
Edward  J.  Kane,  and  George  G.  Kaufman,  Peqpectives  on Safe 
and Sound Banking. (Cambridge:  MIT  Press,  1986),  chap.  4. 
31 Michael  Dotsey  and  Anatoli  Kuprianov,  “Deposit  Insurance 
and  the  Savings  and  Loan  Crisis,”  Working  Paper,  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond,  June  1989. 
14  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  MAY/JUNE  1989 bank  or  thrift  were  declared  insolvent,  the  court 
would  appoint  a receiver  and  instruct  the  deposit  in- 
surance  agency  to  initially  compensate  only  legally 
insured  depositors. 
Of  course,  for  such  an  approach  to  be  workable, 
some  deposits  must  be  uninsured.32  As  long  as  all 
deposits  a bank  issues  are  fully  insured,  there  will 
be  little  incentive  for  creditors  to  force  the  bank 
into  bankruptcy  proceedings.  The  bank  could  simply 
meet  all  its  bills  by  accepting  additional  insured 
deposits,  much  as many  insolvent  thrifts  have  done 
with  brokered  deposits  in recent  years.  Therefore, 
it is critical  that  at least  some  depositors  be  placed 
at  risk  of  loss  so  that  when  the  financial  condition 
of  the  bank  becomes  questionable  it  is forced  into 
bankruptcy  proceedings  or  reorganized  before  it 
actually  becomes  economically  insolvent. 
“Safe Banking”  The  above  measures  might  seem 
unduly  harsh,  if not  disruptive,  to  some.  If so,  there 
are  two  alternatives  short  of abandoning  deposit  in- 
surance.  One  is  to  stay  with  the  current  system. 
That  this  would  be  intolerable  is obvious  from  the 
current  situation.  The  other  alternative  is to  adopt 
a “safe banking”  system  that  separates  banks’ deposit 
taking  and  payment  activities  from  risky  lending. 
There  are  several  such  proposals.33  They  gener- 
ally have  in common  that  they  would  limit  banks  to 
“safe” investments  such  as government  securities  and 
highly  rated  corporate  securities.  Commercial  lend- 
ing  would  be  by  separate  entities  funded  by  com- 
32 The  same  function  might  also be  served  by subordinated  debt. 
Since  the  interests  of the  subordinated  debt  holders  and  of the 
deposit  insurance  agencies  might  not  always  coincide,  however, 
proposals  that  rely  on  subordinated  debt  should  be  looked  at 
carefully. 
33 See,  for  example,  Robert  E.  Litan,  W/MT  Should Banks Do? 
(Washington,  D.C.:  Brookings  Institution,  1987),  and  Lowell 
Bryan,  Breaking Up the Bank (Homewood,  Illinois:  Dow  Jones- 
Irwin,  1988). 
mercial  paper.  The  salient  characteristic  is  that 
depositors  would  be  required  to  sacrifice  the 
economic  gains  made  possible  by  the  existence  of 
financial  intermediaries  that  combine  the  functions 
of offering  both  payment  services  and lending  facilities 
in return  for virtually  complete  safety.  But under  such 
a system,  it is unclear  why  deposit  insurance  would 
be necessary,  other  than  to protect  depositors  against 
cases  of  outright  fraud  and  theft. 
It may  be  too  early  to pursue  such  an alternative. 
But  if the  moral  hazard  in deposit  insurance  cannot 
be controlled,  there  may  be no other  feasible  choice. 
Conclusion 
Just  as the  paper  began  with  a paradox,  it will con- 
clude  with  a variation  of the  same  paradox:  To  make 
banking  safer,  it  must  be  made  less  safe  for  bank 
creditors.  In other  words,  unless  depository  institu- 
tions  know  they  can  fail and  will be  allowed  to  fail, 
some  may  not  have  sufficient  incentives  to conduct 
their  business  in  a  safe  manner. 
In order  to encourage  responsible  behavior,  several 
aspects  of  the  current  system  must  change.  First, 
regulators  should  have  the  means  to  deal  promptly 
and firmly  with  insolvencies  before  they  threaten  the 
soundness  of the  deposit  insurance  funds.  Second, 
no  institution  should  be  considered  too  big  to  fail. 
Third,  no  depositors  or  creditors  except  those  in- 
sured  under  the  law  should  be  treated  as  insured. 
Fourth,  the  flow  of  information  to  the  market 
should  be  as accurate  as possible.  Fifth,  explicit  and 
credible  policies  should  be in place  for handling  future 
failures. 
None  of the  above  measures  is meant  as a panacea. 
Some  bankers  will still make  bad loans  and as a result 
some  banks  will fail. But  the  above  measures  should 
at least  help  avoid  the  widespread  insolvencies  that 
in the  1980s  were  the  result  of the  lopsided  incen- 
tives  inherent  in  the  deposit  insurance  system. 
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